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Policies to Make Work Pay for 
People With Disabilities
Richard V. Burkhauser 
Syracuse University
The onset of a disability need not, and in the majority of cases does 
not, mean the end of work for people with disabilities (see Burkhauser 
and Daly 1996a, 1996b). The premise that most people with disabili 
ties can work contradicts the image of people with disabilities as "vic 
tims." Dedicated disability advocates have succeeded in getting an 
increasing share of young people with disabilities on the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) rolls. The question is, should this continue to be 
the primary policy goal of our disability system?
Previous chapters in this book have documented that changes in the 
business cycle and in policy variables account for more of the growth 
in Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI applications and 
awards over the past decade than does a nationwide decline in health. 
General economic conditions and the relative ease of access to and 
generosity of benefits encourage some people with disabilities to apply 
for benefits. Aarts, Burkhauser, and de long (1996) offer additional 
evidence that this is happening internationally. They compare disability 
transfer populations across countries and time periods and argue that 
these differences cannot be explained by differences in underlying 
health conditions alone. In 1994 the United States had about five work 
ing-age people on disability transfers for every one hundred workers, 
while in the Netherlands, which has an extremely generous and easily 
accessible disability transfer system, there were fifteen working-age 
people on disability transfers per one hundred workers. Policy matters.
But this does not imply that all persons with disabilities can work. 
There is great diversity within the population with disabilities both 
with respect to the severity of their disability and the skills they bring 
to the workforce. Those with disabilities who also have poor work 
skills are doubly disadvantaged in the labor market. Nevertheless,
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while severe disabilities or poor work skills limit market opportunities, 
the previous chapters are heartening because they suggest that changes 
in policy could result in more employment for people with disabilities.
To date, efforts to encourage disability transfer recipients off the 
rolls via extending Medicaid benefits or lowering the implicit tax on 
SSI benefits have not been successful. This is not surprising, given 
Moffitt's (1992) study of exits from AFDC and his more recent study 
(Hoynes and Moffitt 1996) of exits from disability transfer programs. 
Both papers suggest that people on government transfer rolls are not 
very sensitive to tax rate changes. In fact, Hoynes and Moffitt argue 
that making eligibility easier for those with disabilities who do work is 
likely to increase program participation rather than lower it, since a 
large share of people with disabilities who work might become eligible 
for benefits with a more relaxed work test. It appears doubtful that any 
of the back-to-work incentives now being tried will succeed.
Furthermore, Bound (1989) documents that the majority of those 
who go through the DI application process and are rejected do not 
return to work. Initially, these findings suggest that policy variables 
may not be important in the decision of people with disabilities to 
work, since few applicants to DI and SSI, rejected or successful, return 
to work.
But there is an alternative explanation. The timing of a work-based 
intervention may be as important as the intervention itself. By the time 
people with disabilities have gone through the long application and 
appeals process, in which not working is critical evidence of an 
"inability to perform substantial gainful activity," most of their links to 
the labor market have been severed. Hence, interventions to return 
them to work are much less likely to succeed than those applied imme 
diately following the onset of a disability to reduce the likelihood of 
their leaving work.
There is evidence that early intervention- helps to keep people with 
disabilities in the workforce. Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995) find 
that accommodation by employers extends tenure on the job following 
the onset of a disability. The average worker without accommodation 
stayed 2.2 years with his employer after onset. The average worker 
who was accommodated stayed 7.5 years with his employer after 
onset. To put this another way, 75 percent of those who were not 
accommodated were gone after three years. But it was nine years
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before 75 percent of workers who were accommodated left their 
employer.
If the timing of an intervention is critical to its success, then there 
may also be more effective strategies to reduce the disability rolls and 
further increase work among people with disabilities than are currently 
being tried. Below I suggest four such possibilities.
TAX-SUPPORTED SUBSIDIES TO KEEP EMPLOYEES 
WITH DISABILITIES ON THE JOB
Employers are much more likely to accommodate workers who 
become disabled on the job than to take on new workers with disabili 
ties. Most employers have made some investment in their employees 
and have better knowledge of their work capabilities than they do of 
potential employees. Hence, it is not surprising that they are more will 
ing to maintain such workers on the job after the onset of a disability 
than they are to hire new workers with disabilities. But it is not obvious 
that the stick of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 mandate is 
the appropriate mechanism for increasing accommodation. The carrot 
of tax-supported subsidies to pay for employer-provided accommoda 
tions would be more effective. Moreover, it would get us out of the 
habit of thinking that such accommodations, which we pay for in 
higher prices for the products we buy, are costless just because the 
costs do not show up on the federal budget.
TAX SUBSIDIES FOR RELATIVELY LOW-PRODUCTIVITY 
WORKERS
A larger share of people with disabilities work full time in Sweden 
and Germany than in the United States because Sweden, through direct 
job creation, and Germany, through explicit quotas, directly intervene 
in the labor market to make sure that people with disabilities are 
employed. Neither of these interventions into the labor market make 
political sense in the United States. But there is a uniquely American
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alternative to such direct market interventions: the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC).
The EITC, which currently uses the tax system to subsidize the 
work of low-income families with children, could substantially 
increase work by people with disabilities, especially those with low 
productivity. In 1993, the Clinton administration, with bipartisan sup 
port, dramatically increased the size and scope of this program. In 
1996, workers with two children received 40 cents in benefits for every 
dollar of their labor earnings up to a maximum of $8,900. For a mini 
mum-wage worker, for instance, this tax credit transforms a $5.15 per 
hour minimum wage into a wage of $7.21 per hour ($5.15 x 1.40 = 
$7.21).
A variation on this program would offer a Disabled Workers' Tax 
Credit (DWTC) to subsidize the labor earnings of people with disabili 
ties who live in low-income households. This would especially target 
the doubly disadvantaged, whose work skills yield them relatively low 
labor earnings in the private sector. For instance, a 40 percent tax 
credit on the wage earnings of those aged 18 to 25 with a disability 
would 1) encourage children with disabilities reaching the age of tran 
sition from school to work to choose work rather than SSI, and 2) off 
set, to a large degree, the effective tax rate on current SSI recipients 
who do work. The 1996 National Academy of Social Insurance's Dis 
ability Policy Panel recommends such a credit for a broad range of 
people with disabilities who have serious disabilities, whether or not 
they are eligible for disability transfer benefits (Mashaw and Reno 
1996). (For a broader discussion of the DWTC, see Burkhauser, 
Glenn, and Wittenburg 1997.)
A great public policy tragedy occurred in 1993 when the Assistant 
Secretary for Policy Evaluation, David Ellwood, convinced the admin 
istration to push for an extension of the EITC but no one in the admin 
istration or in the disability advocacy community seized that moment 
to extend the credit to people with disabilities. I understand why Ell- 
wood didn't do it. He, like most poverty policy experts, divides the 
population into two groups: those who are expected to work and those 
who are not expected to work. To him people with disabilities are not 
expected to work. But where were the disability advocates? Why didn't 
they push the message behind the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 to its logical conclusion and fight to extend the EITC as a means
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of further integrating the doubly disadvantaged into the labor market? I 
believe in 1993 there would have been a bipartisan majority ready to 
make that logical step if only someone had pointed the way. A biparti 
san majority continues to support the EITC's role as the major federal 
program aimed at making work pay. And I believe the passage of a 
DWTC is possible. But to achieve this goal, policymakers need to be 
convinced that most people with disabilities can work and should 
therefore be expected to work. And, therefore, that people with disabil 
ities should first be targeted for work-based programs, not transfer pro 
grams. But to win over policymakers, it is first necessary that the 
advocates of people with disabilities believe that work is possible.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Previous chapters have documented how the Social Security Admin 
istration's outreach efforts, together with state efforts to shift welfare 
costs, increased applications for SSL This is further evidence that the 
marching orders federal and state policymakers give to the frontline 
gatekeepers of our disability system influence the work versus transfer 
outcomes of people with disabilities. The Carter administration in 1978 
sent word to state administrators that DI and SSI rolls were rising too 
fast and that the eligibility process needed tightening. This moral, or 
immoral suasion, depending on your point of view, greatly reduced 
acceptance rates with no formal change in the law.
Aarts, Burkhauser, and de long (1996) compare work and transfer 
aspects in the disability programs of several western industrial coun 
tries. Those countries in which gatekeepers are given a clear signal that 
return-to-work is the primary goal of disability policy—e.g., Sweden 
and Germany—are the countries that best achieve this goal.
While the supply of disability applicants is influenced by the indi 
vidual incentives they perceive, the "demand" for applicants by gate 
keepers, which can be evidenced both by explicit procedures as well as 
by attitudes, also matters. If the gatekeepers of our disability system 
are signaled that successful placements into rehabilitation, training, 
and jobs are their measure of administrative success, it is likely we will 
see more such placements. But, unlike many European countries, our
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rehabilitation system is almost completely separate from our benefits 
transfer system, and it would be much harder to achieve coordination 
between the two.
TIME-LIMITED BENEFITS
To be eligible for permanent SSI or DI benefits, a person must be 
unable to perform "substantial gainful activity" for at least one year. I 
propose that those who meet this criterion but still may recover or be 
able to return to work after one year be given only a temporary SSI or 
DI benefit. After one year they would be fully reevaluated for perma 
nent benefits. During this temporary benefit period, recipients would 
have an opportunity to receive training and/or rehabilitation necessary 
to put them back to work. This proposal is much more important now 
that DI and SSI are shifting from bridges to early retirement toward 
lifelong programs for younger workers.
CONCLUSION
For the majority of people with disabilities, onset of a disability 
occurs after they have entered employment. Most people continue to 
work for some time after the onset of a disability. The timing of poli 
cies to prolong workforce participation may prove to be as important as 
the implementation itself, policymakers should begin to make work 
pay for people with disabilities through tax subsidies to employers, dis 
ability tax credits, the use of temporary benefits as a mechanism for 
trying rehabilitation before permanent transfers, and as a general signal 
to gatekeepers that return to work is the primary goal of social policy. 
The enactment of these pro-work reforms is likely to reduce the dis 
ability transfer population and increase the employment of people with 
disabilities.
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